Robert and Irene Jackson purchased Hickory Hill, a six-acre property in rural McLean, Virginia, in Summer 1941. At that time, Jackson was United States Attorney General and a nominee to serve as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. He soon was confirmed and commissioned as a justice. The Jacksons closed on their purchase of Hickory Hill and lived there for the rest of his life.

Robert was born on a Pennsylvania farm and then grew up in the rural areas of western New York State. Irene came from a city, Kingston, New York, but she also enjoyed the outdoors. In particular, they both were horse people, so it was a joy for them to live at Hickory Hill, to have horses in their own barn at their home, to sometimes raise pigs and other animals too, to grow lots of vegetables, and to have open space, all not too far from Robert’s Supreme Court workplace and their deep ties in Washington, D.C.

The Hickory Hill property—an antebellum house, expansive lawn, trees, stable, horses, other animals, gardens, cars, and other machinery—was a lot to manage, and of course Justice Jackson had a demanding day job. So he and Irene employed a handyman/caretaker, Stuart Loy, who really ran and maintained the place. Loy, a native Virginian, was highly skilled and a very hard worker. He became the Jacksons’ friend, joining them and other family members and friends on horse rides, hikes, and fishing trips.

Although Stuart Loy had the big job of maintaining Hickory Hill, he also did at least some moonlighting. Maybe it was paid, but my guess is that he just volunteered sometimes to assist others in the area.

One instance of this occurred on Friday evening, May 2, 1952. Loy used an old rotary mower to cut the lawn of the Jacksons’ friends Sam and Mary Neel, who lived with their young family in the house next door. As Loy was mowing, a blade flew off, severing his Achilles tendon. Mary Neel bandaged him up and took him to a hospital.

The Jacksons were not home, it seems, when Loy was injured. Perhaps Justice Jackson was working late at the Supreme Court, preparing for the justices’ conference the next morning. (In early May 1952, the justices were busy drafting opinions in cases that had been argued that term. They also were considering appeals and petitions for review, including some that were momentous. In the next days, they would agree to hear on an emergency basis Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, a case that produced one of the leading decisions in Court history. The case concerned the constitutionality of President Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills to prevent them from being shut down by a steelworkers’ strike during that Korean War period. (A few weeks later, the Court decided that the president had acted unconstitutionally.)

A doctor treated Stuart Loy’s injury. Soon all was well—Loy, after being laid up for a time, recovered and resumed working.

Because Loy was injured while working, the doctor reported the incident to Virginia’s Industrial Commission. He also reported that Justice Jackson was Loy’s employer.

The Commonwealth of Virginia checked its records and found no indication that employer Jackson had workmen’s compensation insurance. State law required employers of seven or more people to purchase and maintain such insurance.

On July 24, Virginia wrote to Justice Jackson. It notified him of the situation, asked how many employees he had, directed him to show that if he had seven or more employees he had insurance, and added that he faced the possibility of a fine “for failure to report promptly and properly accidents.”

Justice Jackson did not receive this letter. He was on vacation at the Bohemian Grove in California. He thus did not reply.

The Commonwealth of Virginia, apparently feeling that Jackson was ignoring its letter, sent him a second letter on August 7. It repeated that Jackson had a duty to report to the Commonwealth on his number of employees and his workmen’s compensation insurance coverage. Virginia also stated, perhaps showing some deference to Jackson’s position as a Supreme Court justice, that it was giving him ten extra days to respond.

By Saturday, August 9, Justice Jackson was back in Washington. He soon found the Commonwealth of Virginia’s two letters to him.

On August 13, Jackson wrote back to Virginia. He reported that:

• Stuart Loy was injured at the Neels’ home, not at the Jacksons’;
• Loy was injured by a mower that was not Jackson’s;
• he employs Loy “by the week … as chauffeur and caretaker of my premises”;
• he paid Loy’s full wages every week when he was recovering from the injury “because he needed it”;
• he (Jackson) did not employ seven people—at most he employed Loy plus one maid in the house, and sometimes 2-3 more day helpers on special occasions.

And that was, it seems, the end of it. At least that is the end of the correspondence in the papers that Justice Jackson preserved as a set.

It seems that Jackson’s conduct, once he got around to explaining it, was fully satisfactory.

Stuart Loy continued to work happily for the Jacksons and to be friendly with the Neels.

Following yesterday morning’s state funeral service at Westminster Abbey in London for Queen Elizabeth II, members of her family, some officials from Commonwealth nations, and some members of royal families from around the world traveled to St. George’s Chapel in Windsor Castle. The Queen’s remains were interred there.

Many heads of state, senior foreign government ministers, and international diplomats who had attended the funeral did not travel from London to Windsor. Instead, United Kingdom Foreign Minister James Cleverly hosted them at a reception at Church House. It is a stately red-brick building in an enclosed yard on the Westminster Abbey grounds.

Church House is, as its name communicates, the headquarters office of the Church of England. In June 1940, King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, parents of then-Princess Elizabeth (the future Queen Elizabeth II), opened this Church House building. In 1945, the United Nations Preparatory Commission met there, as did, in 1946, the U.N. Security Council. In 1988, Queen Elizabeth II unveiled a tablet at Church House commemorating the centenary of the Church corporation.

Church House is notable for all of these things, but it is perhaps most notable for being in summer 1945 the site of the London Conference of representatives of the United States, the U.K., the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of France. The U.S. representative—President Truman’s appointee “to act as the Representative of the United States and as its Chief of Counsel in preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers and their principal agents and accessories as the United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an international military tribunal”—was U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson.

Over two-plus months that summer, the London Conference representatives met in official sessions at Church House. They fulfilled and advanced the declarations that their government leaders had made during World War II: that the major German Nazi leaders were international law violators; that they were arch-criminals whose offenses transcended particular locations and affected more than particular victims; and that they should be punished by an international process.

On August 8, 1945, the London Conference concluded with the signing, in Church House, of the London Agreement. It was and is a historic event in international diplomacy and peacemaking and a cardinal development in international law.

In the London Agreement, the Allies announced their decision to take a path of law and public accountability rather than to act summarily, with their unlimited military power and their high desire for vengeance, against their Nazi prisoners. The Allies chose, despite the absence of a peace treaty or any other legal or political constraint, to address the possible legal culpability of former Nazi leaders through a public, juridical process. To do so, the Allies created, in the London Agreement, an international criminal court, the International Military Tribunal. In a Charter annexed to the Agreement, they prescribed the IMT’s constitution, jurisdiction, and functions.

I hope that some of the officials who gathered, mourned, and socialized yesterday at Church House knew and recalled that they were at the 1945 London Conference and London Agreement site—the site of the legal birth of the international Nuremberg trial.

Robert H. Jackson’s ancestors included Englishmen, but it seems that they were not loyal to the crown.

His great-great-grandfather Uri Jackson, who lived from around 1750 until at least 1781, was a farmer in colonial Connecticut. He also served as a corporal in the Connecticut militia during the Revolutionary War.

One of Robert’s great-grandfathers on his father’s side, George Ferros Eldred, was born in London, in the Middle Temple, in 1787. His father William, a barrister, was under treasurer of the Middle Temple, one of the Inns of Court that were homes of English lawyers. But George was William Eldred’s younger son. As Robert Jackson commented in the early 1950s, “younger sons, of course, did not succeed their fathers under the British scheme of things. He came to America.”

Gravestone of George Eldred (died 1878) & Laura Cady Eldred (died 1891), Spring Creek Cemetery, Spring Creek, PennsylvaniaRobert Jackson had various encounters with the top of “the British scheme of things.” The first occurred in summer 1924. Robert Jackson, then a successful New York State lawyer living and working in Jamestown, attended, with his wife Irene—a Kingston [ba-dum-bump], New York, native—an American Bar Association week-long meeting in London with the English Inns of Court, the Law Society, and the Canadian Bar Association. On July 24, 1924, the Jacksons were among many guests who attended a garden party that King George V and Queen Mary hosted at Buckingham Palace.

The Jacksons’ next brush with British royalty occurred in Washington in 1938. King George VI and Queen Elizabeth were visiting the U.S. Robert Jackson was Solicitor General of the U.S. On June 8, he and Irene attended a White House performance for the King and Queen of American music. And the next afternoon, the Jacksons attended a party that British Ambassador Ronald Lindsay and his wife Lady Elizabeth Lindsay (an American) gave for the King and Queen in the garden of the British Embassy.

Seven years later, in spring 1945, as Robert H. Jackson was completing his fourth year of service as an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, President Truman appointed him to serve as U.S. chief of counsel for the prosecution of Axis war criminals in the European Theater. This became Jackson’s fall 1945—summer 1946 job as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg of Nazi war criminals. Before Jackson got to Nuremberg, however, he lived and worked during summer 1945 in London, negotiating with allied government counterparts to create the Nuremberg international court and define its charter.

On August 15, 1945, Justice Jackson took an opportunity to see King George in action at a formal occasion, the opening of Parliament. Jackson obtained a ticket to stand in the Royal Gallery to hear the King’s address. He saw robed and bewigged Lord Chancellor Jowitt, with whom Jackson had worked in the war crimes court negotiations, escort the King (“entirely impassive,” Jackson said later) and the Queen (“bowing to the occupants of each box”). They walked behind his carried crown, “through a line of Beefeaters in scarlet uniforms.” Alas, Jackson in the gallery was unable to hear the King’s address.

Justice Jackson definitely met British royalty at the Supreme Court in 1951. On November 2, 1951, Chief Justice Vinson hosted Princess Elizabeth—soon to become Queen Elizabeth II—and her husband Duke Philip at the Court. The Princess and Duke entered by the Court’s front entrance. They were escorted to the Chief Justice’s chambers. Each of the associate justices, including Jackson, was assembled there and met them. The royals’ tour also included the courtroom. I am sure that it was pleasant and awkwardly official. To my knowledge, Justice Jackson wrote nothing about it.

A final Jackson, or at least a Jackson files, tidbit regarding the British royal family dates to Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation. It occurred in London on June 2, 1953. A French couple, Henry and Arlette Leger, who had worked on Jackson’s Nuremberg staff, were in London on that day. They wrote a postcard noting the occasion to Elsie Douglas, Jackson’s secretary at the Court who had been with him in London and Nuremberg during 1945 and 1946 and became a friend of the Legers. They mailed it with a King George postage stamp.

The postmark, applied the next day, is striking. Cancelling the King George stamp, it announces an official wish that in fact transpired: “Long Live the Queen.”

On Monday, July 11, 2022, Reva Siegel, Professor of Law at Yale University, was Chautauqua Institution’s 18th annual Robert H. Jackson Lecturer on the Supreme Court of the United States.

To view the video of Professor Siegel’s lecture, which focused on the Supreme Court’s June 24 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, declaring the constitutionality of Mississippi’s anti-abortion law and overruling Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), click here:

Professor Siegel also has posted a draft paper, “Memory Games: Dobbs’s Originalism As Anti-Democratic Living Constitutionalism—and Some Pathways for Resistance,” that will be published in the Texas Law Review.  To download and read the paper, click here:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4179622

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 Reva Siegel is the Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law at Yale Law School. She teaches Constitutional Law, Reproductive Justice, and other courses. Her writing draws on legal history to explore questions of law and inequality and to analyze how courts interact with representative government and popular movements in interpreting the Constitution.

For her Yale webpage, click here.

To download and read more of Professor Siegel’s articles, papers, and briefs, visit her Social Science Research Network (SSRN) page:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=100672

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Chautauqua Institution’s Robert H. Jackson Lecture is named in honor of the former Chautauquan, Jamestown lawyer, New Dealer, U.S. Solicitor General, U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Supreme Court justice, and Nuremberg chief prosecutor.

The annual Jackson Lecture at Chautauqua Institution is a leading expert’s consideration of the Supreme Court, its Justices, significant decisions, and related topics in the weeks following the Court’s start of its annual summer recess.

Chautauqua’s Jackson Lecturers have been:

• 2005:  Geoffrey R. Stone, University of Chicago professor;
• 2006:  Linda Greenhouse, New York Times writer and Yale Law School professor;
• 2007:  Seth P. Waxman, WilmerHale partner and former Solicitor General of the United States;
• 2008:  Jeffrey Toobin, legal writer and CNN Worldwide chief legal analyst;
• 2009:  Paul D. Clement, Bancroft PLLC partner and former Solicitor General of the United States;
• 2010:  Jeff Shesol, historian, communications strategist, and former White House speechwriter;
• 2011:  Dahlia Lithwick, senior editor at Slate and Amicus podcast host;
• 2012:  Pamela Karlan, Stanford University professor;
• 2013:  Charles Fried, Harvard University professor and former Solicitor General of the United States;
• 2014:  Akhil Reed Amar, Yale University professor;
• 2015:  Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard University professor;
• 2016:  Tracey L. Meares, Yale University professor;
• 2017:  Judge Jon O. Newman, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
• 2018:  Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, of the Supreme Court of Canada;
• 2019:  Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP partner and former Solicitor General of the U.S.;
• 2020 (online):  Ruth Marcus, Washington Post deputy editorial page editor and columnist; and
• 2021 (online): Melissa Murray, New York University professor and Strict Scrutiny podcast co-host.

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And some final words on Chautauqua Institution—

It is where an attacker last week tried to kill writer Salman Rushdie just before he was to speak on the stage of Chautauqua’s Amphitheater.

That atrocity demonstrates in a tragic way that Chautauqua and all aspects of the peaceful assembly that it stands for are great but also fragile treasures. They were empowering resources in Robert H. Jackson’s own life. They have been that ever since, including in the Jackson Lectures, for so many of us.

We all need to know, value, and rededicate ourselves to nurturing the qualities of living and learning together in peace, at Chautauqua Institution and in all of our places.

This is a quick update on last week’s post.

On June 1, the 80^th anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, I participated in a panel at Georgetown University Law Center with Professors Victoria Nourse, Michele Goodwin, Melissa Murray, and Brad Snyder on “The Unknown History of Reproductive Rights & Eugenics: From Skinner to Roe.”

In Skinner, the Supreme Court unanimously declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma law that provided for the sterilization of some thrice-convicted “habitual criminals.”  Jack Skinner, a state prison inmate, won a decision that protected his reproductive capability and autonomy.

The Skinner decision is an important part of U.S. constitutional law doctrines that protect individuals from government regulations and penalties in the areas of contraception, abortion, private intimacy, and other fundamental bodily rights.

You can watch the panel on C-SPAN, at this link:  https://www.c-span.org/video/?520685-1/history-reproductive-rights.

My lecture, about Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurring opinion in Skinner, other aspects of his judicial work, and his work as U.S. chief prosecutor at Nuremberg of Nazi war criminals, begins at time counter reading 21:20.

As you know, the Supreme Court of the United States is likely to decide very soon, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, whether a Mississippi law banning abortions after fifteen weeks of pregnancy—i.e., well before fetal viability outside the womb—is constitutional.

The Dobbs case involves major constitutional questions regarding abortion rights and women’s rights. It also is about the scope of individual’s rights to bodily integrity and autonomy, including rights to decide freely to have sex or not and a person’s rights to use her/his/their natural bodily capacity to seek to reproduce or not.

These issues and their history will be discussed next Wednesday, June 1, 2022, at noon EDT, in a panel on “The Unknown History of Reproductive Rights & Eugenics: From Skinner to Roe.”

The panel will occur at Georgetown Law School, 600 New Jersey Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. The panel is co-sponsored by the Robert H. Jackson Center.

The panel participants will be:

• Victoria F. Nourse, Ralph W. Whitworth Professor of Law at Georgetown;
• Michele Bratcher Goodwin, Chancellor’s Professor of Law at the University of California-Irvine;
• Melissa Murray, Frederick I. and Grace Stokes Professor of Law at New York University;
• Brad Snyder, Professor of Law and Anne Fleming Research Professor at Georgetown; and
• me.

This event will be free and open to the public. It also will be streamed online.

Anyone who is interested in attending or watching needs to RSVP—

• To attend in-person: https://forms.gle/7oM5FS1YaN5ZwgXA7
• To watch online: https://georgetown.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_b14W_QcpS7Wht2TmiRrm9A.

The occasion for this panel, in addition to the Supreme Court’s impending Dobbs decision, is that its date, June 1, 2022, will mark the 80th anniversary of the Court’s landmark decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.

In Skinner, the Supreme Court unanimously declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma law that provided for the sterilization of “habitual criminals.” Jack Skinner, a state prison inmate, won a decision that protected his reproductive capability and autonomy. The decision became an important starting point for constitutional law doctrines that protect individuals from government regulations and penalties in the areas of contraception, abortion, private intimacy, and other fundamental rights.

When Skinner was argued and decided in 1942, Justice Robert H. Jackson was the Supreme Court’s junior justice—he had been appointed less than a year earlier. In the case, Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion that is textually compact and conceptually very large. (I will have more to say about that opinion on the panel next Wednesday.)

Some links—

• Skinner v. Oklahoma (June 1, 1942); and
• Professor Nourse’s book, In Reckless Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near Triumph of American Eugenics.

So please spread the word, RSVP, attend next week’s “Skinner Day” event, or watch online.

I and we look forward to seeing some, even many, of you at Georgetown Law School next Wednesday.

In 1935, the United States Congress passed and President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the Social Security Act. It was a momentous piece of welfare legislation, designed to minimize the human suffering caused by unemployment and by old-age poverty. The law attacked these problems with new federal taxes on employers and employees, with expenditures and credits to encourage States to enact unemployment tax and compensation systems, and with guarantees of and expenditures for old-age pensions.

Private business interests, objecting to these new regulations, filed federal lawsuits attacking the constitutionality of both parts of the Social Security law. In 1937, after mixed judgments in federal courts of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court took the cases.

Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Division) Robert H. Jackson and DOJ attorney Charles E. Wyzanski. They argued Steward Machine Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, on the constitutionality of the Social Security Act taxes on employers, on April 8 and 9, 1937. They argued Helvering v. Davis, on constitutionality of Social Security’s old-age benefits and the employer taxes that pay for them, on May 5.

The Court’s decisions came swiftly.

On Monday, May 24, 1937—on this date eighty-five years ago—the justices took the bench at noon. Spectators, anticipating the decisions, had been there for hours. Robert Jackson, Charles Wyzanski, and many other government officials were there too.

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, looking to his left to the far end of the bench, nodded to the junior justice, Benjamin N. Cardozo. Cardozo announced that he had been instructed to deliver the opinion of the Court in the Steward Machine Company case.

A buzz went through the courtroom. The crowd recognized immediately that the Court was upholding the constitutionality of Social Security’s unemployment insurance taxes and connected provisions—Cardozo announcing the decision could mean nothing else.

The decision was 5-4. Justice Cardozo, announcing the Court’s opinion, spoke with, for him, atypical clarity and force. Justice James C. McReynolds then spoke extemporaneously, stating his dissent, and that “the Union is being destroyed.” Justice George Sutherland then announced his dissent, which Justice Willis Van Devanter joined, on a narrow issue. Justice Pierce Butler then announced his more sweeping dissenting opinion.

Justice Cardozo then announced his opinion for the Court in Helvering v. Davis. It upheld the constitutionality of Social Security’s old-age benefits and employer taxes. The vote was 7-2. Cardozo announced the dissenting votes of Justices McReynolds and Butler, who did not write opinions.

Justices then announced decisions in six other cases, and then they recessed for the day.

Some celebrations occurred.

Justice Cardozo, who coincidentally turned sixty-seven that day, posed (or maybe he had done so that morning) for a press photograph at his apartment. If he celebrated his birthday at all, he likely did it quietly.

Robert Jackson and Charles Wyzanski accepted numerous congratulations, first at the Court and, later, back the Department of Justice.

In one sense, they had done very much—they had, by winning, ensured the survival of one of the U.S.’s most decent laws.

But Jackson and Wyzanski were, of course, merely (excellent) advocates. The Court rendered the judgments. And so the Court as an institution, and specifically the five and the seven justices who were in the respective decision majorities, did much more than the lawyers had.

But really even the justices—the Court—did not do very much. And properly so. The Court’s decisions in Steward Machine and Davis, which were part of the Court’s turn in spring 1937, simply showed restraint. The decisions recognized the breadth of federal powers under the Constitution. The decisions respected the public majorities and their elected leaders who had used these powers seriously, to promote….

Well, it’s right there in the name of the law: Social Security.

Today marks the sixty-eighth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s May 17, 1954, decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and its companion cases.

Those decisions are among the most important legal events in U.S. history.

They also are, as examples of the U.S. government standing up for the equality that is the U.S. Constitution’s command and its moral core, vital examples for the country today—for all of its people, and for our future.

In Brown, et al., the Supreme Court—Chief Justice Earl Warren and eight Associate Justices, including Robert H. Jackson—held unanimously that government segregation by race of school children was, henceforth, barred by the U.S. Constitution. The Court declared that state government school segregation was barred by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and that federal government school segregation was barred by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Today’s Brown anniversary occurs as the U.S. is looking, I hope very hard, at the realities of racist, anti-Black murders two days ago in Buffalo, New York.

In due course, that killer will be prosecuted at the Robert H. Jackson United States Courthouse in Buffalo.

Please see that those crimes were acts of racial segregation—a person, ignorant, empowered horribly, doing evil, inflicting suffering and death, based on beliefs in racial inequality.

Please reread Brown. Please see it as a high moment when nine justices, persuaded by extraordinary lawyers and by the facts that the justices knew in their own lives, saw racism around them and in government and stood up against it because, legally and morally, that was right.

And then, please, become more American by doing the same.

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For Brown Day reading, here are the decisions:

• Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (and companion cases from Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia — the State cases); and
• Bolling v. Sharpe (from the District of Columbia — the Federal case).

And click this link to get to relevant pieces in the Jackson List archive, including:

• from 2010, “May 17, 1954”;
• from 2011, “Brown Day,” about winning attorney Thurgood Marshall; and
• from 2018, “Nine Votes, Nine Present: The Unanimity of Brown v. Board of Education.”

I’ve learned from a regular Jackson List reader who also is a regular Jeopardy viewer—those are two large, illustrious, and, I think, not insignificantly overlapping groups—that on Monday, May 9, Jeopardy included a second round category, “The Nuremberg Trials.”

The three contestants handled the five questions, each of course phrased as an answer, quite capably but not perfectly.

The Robert H. Jackson question, about his absence from the Supreme Court of the United States to be chief U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg, was not a stumper.

Each contestant did draw a blank on the name of the lead defendant at the 1945-1946 International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, even after seeing his photograph.

This made me smile.  It’s pleasing that that person, once the number two official in a war-waging, murderous regime that proclaimed it would be a thousand-year German Reich, is not at the front of some very smart U.S. minds.

You can watch the segment here:

Yes, indeed: Who was Hermann Goering?

In the history of the Supreme Court of the United States, two people have held the title “Justice Jackson.”

Soon, wonderfully, there will be the third.

The first Justice Jackson—19th century Jackson—was Howell Edmunds Jackson, of Tennessee. He was commissioned an associate justice in 1893, when he was sixty years old. He soon became ill with tuberculosis and died in 1895.

The second Justice Jackson—20^th century Jackson—was, of course, Robert Houghwout Jackson.  Born in 1892 in Pennsylvania, Robert was a small boy during Justice Howell Jackson’s brief service on the Court, but they were not related.  Robert moved to western New York State shortly thereafter.   It was his home from the late 1890s until the U.S. Senate in 1934 began confirming President Roosevelt’s nominations of Robert Jackson—ultimately there were six—to high federal offices.  He was commissioned an associate justice in 1941, when he was forty-nine years old.  He served on the Court, except for one year away prosecuting Nazis at Nuremberg following World War II, until his death in 1954.

The third Justice Jackson—21^st century Jackson—will be Ketanji Brown Jackson.  She is age fifty-one and a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  Nominated in February by President Biden and confirmed yesterday by the U.S. Senate, she will become an associate justice when she is commissioned by the president, probably in June or July.

I always am reluctant to speculate when someone asks me, “What would Robert H. Jackson think?” about a contemporary event.

But for many reasons, I can say that he would be delighted about the coming appointment of the third Justice Jackson.

First, she is accomplished and excellent.  In her academic studies and achievements, in her clerkship training, in her years of private law practice, in her years of government service, in her writing and speaking, and in her personal temperament, she is superb.  Robert Jackson also was every one of those things, so of course he would like and admire that Ketanji Jackson is, well, so Jacksonian.

Second, Robert Jackson would admire what Ketanji Jackson has accomplished and represents as a path-marking woman.  He lived in much more sexist, male-dominated times than our own.  But he was somewhat better than other men in those times—he included strong, trusted colleagues who were women, including his own daughter, his excellent legal secretaries (who were senior advisers and de facto lawyers; one later became a judge), a senior military officer, and government lawyers in his range of high pursuits.  He would regard Ketanji Jackson as equal to any man and be glad to work alongside her on any team.

Third, Robert Jackson would be so delighted to see, in Ketanji Jackson, a Black woman becoming a Supreme Court justice.  He lived in very racist—segregationist; otherwise discriminatory; racially oblivious; white superiority-presumptuous—times.  Across his life, he grew to understand that and to push against it, piece by piece.  As a lawyer, he defended Black clients when others would not.  In government, he fought racial exclusions.  As the Nuremberg chief prosecutor, he saw and held accountable criminals who murdered based on eugenic theories and racist prejudices.  As a judge, he wrote powerfully against anti-Japanese racism (dissenting in Korematsu v. United States) and anti-Black racism (Shepherd v. Florida), and he was part of Court majorities that decided constitutional equal protection landmarks (Sweatt v. Painter; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents; Brown v. Board of Education).  Thurgood Marshall was one of the Supreme Court advocates who Robert Jackson admired, greatly.  Marshall’s colleague Robert Carter told me that Justice Jackson was consistently an NAACP friend on the bench—by which Carter meant someone with a clean heart and an open mind.  Robert Jackson would detest any race-based thought that Ketanji Jackson does not belong on the Court or anywhere.

I know that Justice Robert H. Jackson would love to watch any Supreme Court argument next fall and in years ahead.

I am confident that if that could happen, he would be pleased, deeply, to look at the bench and see Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson.